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Abstract: This article discusses the tools economic theory provides for examining the 
implications of vertical separation in network industries. It argues that advocating vertical 
separation in all cases is too simplistic an answer.  However, the economic profession has 
provided little guidance that would enable regulators to weigh the cost and benefits of 
different ownership and management structures in more sophisticated ways. 
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en years ago, in their now classical book A Theory of Incentives in 
Procurement and Regulation, Jean-Jacques LAFFONT & Jean 
TIROLE wrote: 
"An important question in regulatory theory is to identify the costs and 
benefits of breakups in a regulatory situation. Among these costs are 
those emphasized in the literature on incomplete contracts and 
ownership structure in unregulated industries: reduction of 
coordination, possible expropriation of specific investment […]. 
Divestiture […] would reduce the incentives of the producer of the 
intermediate goods to favor one final good producer over the others. 
We feel that the integration of the literatures on market foreclosure and 
on regulation will help reframe the policy debate." 
This integration has not been achieved. In this article, we would like to 
explain why this debate is important, discuss some of the tools that 
economics provides to shed light on this issue, and discuss some 
preliminary work which we are conducting on the topic. 
We illustrate the problems faced in the railroad industry, where good data 
is available. It is easy to find other industries, where the regulator, or the 
antitrust authority, must grapple with these issues. For instance, in the 
telecommunications sector, the separation between the provision of local 
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Economics Department for its hospitality. We thank a referee for useful comments. 
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telephone access and long distance access has been discussed 
continuously since the beginning of the deregulation movement, and we 
consider very briefly these issues towards the end of the paper. 
  Railroads 
The European Commission has been a fervent proponent of vertical 
separation for a long time. In many "network industries", the Commission 
has asked national governments to separate the management of the 
infrastructure from the provision of services which use this infrastructure. To 
introduce the issues involved, it may be useful to examine an industry which 
the readers of COMMUNICATIONS & STRATEGIES may contemplate with 
a somewhat unconcerned outlook: railroads (but we promise to speak about 
the Communications industries later). 1 We have chosen to use the railroads 
industry as one of our examples because the issues are very similar to those 
found in the telecommunications industries, and because there is better hard 
evidence on the cost of vertical separation. 
The Council Directive 91/440/EEC of 29 July 1991 states: 
"Whereas the future development and efficient operation of the railway 
system may be made easier if a distinction is made between the 
provision of transport services and the operation of infrastructure; 
whereas given this situation, it is necessary for these two activities to 
be separately managed and have separate accounts; 
The aim of this Directive is to facilitate the adoption of the Community 
railways to the needs of the single market and to increase their 
efficiency; [...] 
[...] by separating the management of railway operation and 
infrastructure from the provision of railway transport services, 
separation of accounts being compulsory and organizational or 
institutional separation being optional; 
[…] 
1. Member States shall take the measures necessary to ensure that 
the accounts for business relating to the provision of transport services 
and those for business relating to the management of railway 
infrastructure are kept separate. ... 
                     
1 The material that follows is based on the research of our colleagues at the IDEI, especially 
Guido Friebel and Marc Ivaldi. All misinterpretations are our responsibility. 
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2. Member States may also provide that this separation shall require 
the organization of distinct divisions within a single undertaking or that 
the infrastructure shall be managed by a separate entity." 
This Directive is worth quoting at some length, as it provides a 
description of the choices available to the national regulators, which are 
illustrated in Figure 1. 
Figure 1 
 
The Member States are not allowed to keep the former model of an 
integrated, and regulated, utility with no competition either upstream or 
downstream. The Commission would prefer total separation of the 
infrastructure’s management from service providers, firms A and B in the 
figure. However, they are allowed to keep an integrated competitor, as long 
as a) it faces significant downstream competition and b) that there is a 
strong separation between its downstream unit and the manager of the 
infrastructure – this is represented by the heavy black line in the third panel 
in the picture. (Of course, very similar language can be found in the different 
documents which form the basis of the European framework for the 
Telecommunications Industry.) 
The Commission pursues two objectives through these policies: the 
creation of a common market on the one hand and increased efficiency on 
the other hand. However, there is evidence that an integrated management 
of infrastructure and services is the optimal structure in some industries – 
railroad being one of them. 
Since the early 80s, the US rail industry has reduced both its workforce 
and its track-mileage by 50 percent. At the same time the market share of 
rail in the freight market has increased, from 11.8% in 1993 to 12.2% in 
2002. During this period, there has been a significant merger wave, which 
has increased the market power of railroads. However, it appears that the 
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potentially adverse effects of this concentration have been more then 
compensated by efficiency gains. As a result, the consumer surplus in U.S. 
rail freight markets has increased by about 30% between 1986 and 2001. 
Railroads in the US carry mostly freight, and all freight companies own their 
respective infrastructure. The superiority of an integrated structure in this 
industry is confirmed by IVALDI & McCULLOUGH (2004) who use US data 
to test for sub-additivity in the cost function for infrastructure and freight 
operations. They estimate that the total operational cost incurred by firms 
running each activity is 2.42% higher than that of a vertically integrated firm. 
In Japan, where trains carry mainly passengers, the 6 regional passenger 
rail companies all operate on their own infrastructure. They are regulated by 
a nationwide regulator who compares their performance. MIZUTANI & 
SHOJI (2001) study the Kobe-Kosoku Railway and find that the costs of 
vertically separated firms are 5.6% higher than those of an integrated 
system. 2 
The efficiency gains from integrated management can seem evanescent 
and a bit abstract. Our colleagues Guido Friebel and Marc Ivaldi put flesh on 
these gains in a case study of wheels (see IVALDI, 2006). The wheels of 
railroad wagons and locomotives work best when they are round. However, 
as a wagon is operating, the wear and tear on the wheels is not symmetric 
and they become more irregular. This has negative consequences for the 
infrastructure: the wear-and-tear on the tracks is increased as is the risk of 
accidents. Of course, this implies that the suppliers of services create 
externalities towards the manager of the infrastructure; we would expect that 
integration would make them take into account these externalities in their 
choice of maintenance strategy. But there is more. 
Recently, technologies have been developed that can help identify 
irregularities in the wheels through sensors in the tracks and transponders 
on the wagons and locomotives. These technologies generate precise data; 
they facilitate the identification of irregular wheels and help focus the 
maintenance efforts. The implementation of these technologies requires new 
investments both at the train and at the track levels, and also a 
                     
2 Not all studies show gains of integrated management of infrastructure and services. For 
instance, SHIRES et al. (1999) compare the cost of the Swedish operator after a reform 
involving vertical separation, and find that operating costs had been reduced by 10%, although 
it is not clear whether this efficiency gain could not have been caused by other aspects of the 
reform. 
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standardization of the data. We will argue below that some degree of 
integration would, at least potentially facilitate such investments. 
These studies suggest that we should at the very least ask ourselves 
whether important efficiency gains are foregone by insisting on strong 
vertical separation. To shed light on this issue, we review below the 
theoretical reasons why integrated firms might be more efficient than 
vertically separated firms. 
Of course, against these potential efficiency gains from integration, we 
should weigh the risk that competition is biased when the infrastructure 
manager has incentives to favour one of the service providers. It is this fear 
that induced the Commission in a 2002 communication to ask for very strong 
independence of the infrastructure manager: 
"The independence of essential infrastructure management functions 
such as train path allocation from the business of railway undertakings 
constitutes a prerequisite for the beneficial effects of allowing 
authorised applicants on the rail freight market. ... The Commission will 
meanwhile monitor closely the effectiveness of the existing sectoral 
framework in facilitating fair and non-discriminatory access to 
infrastructure."  
And indeed, there have been circumstances where European integrated 
operators have been accused of discriminating against the rivals of their own 
provider of services. 3 
  Costs and benefits of vertical separation 
Consider the two firms, U and D in figure 2, where U, the upstream firm, 
provides an input that D, the downstream uses to produce a final product.  
For the industries considered in this article, U would be the infrastructure 
manager and D the provider of services. The main question we ask is the 
following one. When are we better off if these two firms are managed 
together, as one integrated entity? Conversely, when are we better off if 
these two firms are owned by different entities?  
                     
3 For instance, in The Netherlands: there have been accusations that lack of cooperation by the 
tasks organizations prevented, in the mid-1990s, the entrant Lovers Rail to compete with the 
incumbent on the core network. 
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Figure 2 
 
The economic literature has tackled the problem following two different 
approaches. The first approach concentrates on market power. If both firms 
are independently owned, and if they fix their prices independently of each 
other, neither will internalize the reduction in sales of the other one when it 
increases its own price. This "double marginalization" phenomenon implies 
that the final price will be higher with two different firms than with a single 
integrated supplier, and that profits will be lower. Both the firms and the 
consumers benefit from integration. In other words profits and welfare go 
hand in hand and are enhanced by integration. It should be noticed that 
these results are mitigated when firms use more sophisticated pricing 
mechanisms than simply announcing a price per unit. 
Similar inefficiencies arise when, as is often the case, the downstream 
firm provides services that increase the value of the goods to consumers 
and/or the profit of the upstream firm: advice, sales effort, financial 
arrangements, ... These services create positive externalities towards U, as 
they increase the value of the goods for the consumers and therefore the 
level of demand. As it is generally impossible to write the first-best contract 
specifying the optimal level of these services, they tend to be undersupplied. 
  Efficiency benefits of vertical integration 
More important for our purposes is the branch of literature that has 
examined the efficiency implications of vertical integration, and its mirror 
image, vertical separation. Forgetting the exercise of market power, under 
which circumstances are the combined costs of firms U and D reduced when 
they are jointly owned?  
The difficulty of this problem is illustrated by the following two 
"paradoxes". Williamson proposed the paradox of selective intervention, 
which shows that it is always optimal to merge firms U and D. This is 
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because, it would always be possible, or so it seems, to instruct the 
managers of what has become two divisions of the new merged firm, to act 
exactly as if the firms had not merged. In this case, there would be no 
benefit, but also no cost to the merger. In general, it will be possible to 
extract small gains from the merger by "selective intervention" in minor 
decisions: sharing a parking lot, benefiting from better prices because of bulk 
purchases, etc. Either way, this seems to prove that a well managed merger 
can never be detrimental to efficiency. 
The second paradox goes exactly in the opposite direction. It implies that 
there is never any efficiency gain from merging. If such efficiency gains 
existed and could be identified, the parties could capture them by staying 
independent and signing a contract that commits them to acting exactly as if 
they had merged. 4 
Of course, in reality vertical integration and vertical separation are not 
equivalent – these paradoxes are just meant to illustrate the difficulty of 
pinpointing the benefits of one or the other. In practice, it seems that 
merging firms overestimate the benefits and underestimate the costs of 
vertical integration. One may wonder whether regulators, as well as 
competition authorities, do not underestimate (or, maybe, do not want to 
take into account) the efficiency benefits of integration. 
  The basic trade-off 
In the economic literature on vertical integration vs. vertical separation, a 
consensus seems to exist 5 around the following basic trade-off. Vertical 
integration decreases the costs of coordination between the two entities. In 
particular, since the publication of GROSSMAN & HART (1986)’s very 
influential paper, the literature has stressed the fact that vertical integration 
provides better incentives to invest in "specific'" capital, that is capital which 
is only (or at least, much more) useful within the framework of the 
relationship between U and D. On the other hand, vertical integration 
                     
4 This is essentially the argument that COASE (1960) makes regarding private negotiations to 
solve the externalities problems. 
5 Although there is a general consensus about the costs and benefits of these two structures, 
there are very different theories as to why this trade-off exists. 
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decreases the "power" of incentives, as the managers of U and D are less 
responsible for the results of their own actions. 
It may be useful to work through an example to better grasp the trade-
offs which are involved. Consider a company which owns an oil field and a 
refinery. For the purposes of this example, we assume that the oil can only 
be processed in this specific refinery. We compare the two situations 
represented graphically as follows: 
OIL FIELD  →  PIPELINE  →  REFINERY 
OIL FIELD →    BOAT   →  REFINERY 
In the first case, the oil must be carried from the oil field to the refinery 
through a pipeline. In the second, the oil field and the refinery are both close 
to a harbour, and the transportation is done by boat. It seems intuitive that in 
the first case, one would choose to have common ownership of the field, the 
pipeline and the refinery, whereas in the second vertical separation would be 
optimal.  
The fundamental reason for this different treatment of essentially identical 
activity (transportation of oil) lies in the characteristics of the capital that is 
used. In the first case, the capital is specific: the investments in the oil field, 
the pipeline and the refinery have no value except in the relationship 
between these three entities. In these cases, vertical integration decreases 
the need for elaborate contracts specifying for instance the type and quantity 
of maintenance that each of the parties has to incur. Furthermore, one can 
assume that the contracts can never be fool-proof. The consequences of 
underinvestment in the reliability of any of the three facilities would be borne 
in part by the owners of the other parts. Consequently, vertical separation 
would create opportunities and incentives for free-riding. Summing up, when 
there is specific capital, vertical integration tends to decrease the cost of 
production. 
When boat transportation is available, the capital required to transport the 
oil is not specific. It is possible to use the boat for other purposes, and it is 
possible to hire other boats. Vertical separation makes it easier to provide 
incentives for the managers of the boat: if they do not perform well enough, 
there is little cost to switch to another supplier.  
We examine in the next pages the way in which this trade-off plays in the 
case of regulated industries.  
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  Regulatory issues 
Before turning to a theoretical description of the tradeoffs faced by 
regulators, it may be useful to examine an example of the type of 
discrimination that regulators fear. 
REIFFEN & WARD (2002) note 6: 
"Indeed, given these features of the cellular industry, it is not surprising 
that there is evidence of discriminatory behavior by local telephone 
companies [...]. 
[...] Specifically, during Bell Atlantic's 271 hearing regarding service in 
New York state, complaints were voiced about Bell Atlantic's provision 
of interconnection services to rival wireless carriers.  Omnipoint, ... 
noted that `Bell Atlantic missed between 34% and 65% of `Firm 
Commitment Order' dates (installation dates agreed to in advance) for 
connecting new antennae in the New York Metropolitan area.' 
In its Comment, Omnipoint also claimed that Bell Atlantic 
discriminatorily provided lower-quality interconnection than it provided 
Bell Atlantic's own customers [...]. 
These complaints have focused on the provision of interconnection to 
new antennae. It is plausible that discrimination against rival wireless 
companies could take this form, both because such discrimination is 
difficult for regulators to detect, and because it is potentially significant 
to wireless carriers." 
It is important to realize that there would be no debate if the regulator had 
very good regulatory instruments. It would announce a maximum delay and 
would punish Bell Atlantic for missing the deadlines. But if Bell Atlantic knew 
that it would be punished for lateness, it would simply announce longer 
delays and continue to discriminate against its competitors. The regulator 
needs to have some idea of the reasonable delays in order to regulate this 
relationship. 7 
As far as the quality of interconnection is concerned, not only does the 
regulator ignore what the cost of improving it is; he also finds it very difficult 
to measure it. To the adverse selection problem is added a moral hazard 
                     
6 Disclaimer: for the sake of discussion, we will take these facts as given. We have no 
independent evidence about the specific situation, and our statements should not be viewed as 
attributing guilt to one party or the other. 
7 Of course, the cost of lowering the delay is private information of Bell Atlantic. An optimal 
regulation would provide incentives to announce shorter delay. In order to reduce the 
informational rents of Bell Atlantic, the regulator should have a reasonable idea of what these 
costs are. 
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problem, which is made even  worse by the fact that quality differences may 
not be the consequence of a deliberate policy choice - they could be the 
consequences of many local decisions within the firm that favour internal 
clients. 
  Separation of accounts or divestiture? 
There are different ways in which regulators impose separation between 
the activities of the infrastructure manager and of any supplier of services 
that it owns. One method is to impose or to encourage vertical separation or 
divestiture. The second method is to require that the two activities be 
managed separately. A third approach is to impose separation of accounts. 
Separation of accounts by itself does not impose any behaviour; it is 
important for its side effects. In particular it gives the regulator instruments to 
verify whether the firm obeys non-discrimination rules. On the other hand, 
the differences between organizational separation and institutional 
separation are more subtle and deserve some comments. 8 If organizational 
separation implies that the regulator has enough instruments to force the 
integrated firm to run its two units in a totally independent manner, there is 
no difference. 
The following simplified description of the consequences of the two 
different types of separation may be useful. It is reasonable to assume that 
the regulator has more control over short-run decisions made by firms than 
over long-run investment decisions. Even if the regulator were able to limit 
discrimination in the short run, he would not be able to prevent the 
technological investments of the infrastructure manager from being biased in 
favour of the supplier of services owned by the infrastructure operator. 9 
Furthermore, it seems reasonable to assume that, when there is only 
organizational separation, both the infrastructure manager and the service 
                     
8 The French terminology on this topic is useful. It distinguishes “séparation juridique” and 
“séparation de propriété”. This emphasizes the fact that in one case the two entities are 
managed in ways which are totally independent, and in the other that they have distinct 
ownership. It still leaves open the reason why this makes a difference and, more importantly, 
what differences it makes. 
9 For simplicity and concreteness, we speak as if the firm which manages the infrastructure 
owned the service supplier. Our discussion is independent of the actual structure of ownership 
and we would reach the same conclusions if the service supplier owned the manager of 
infrastructure or if they were both owned by a third entity. 
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supplier choose their investments to maximize joint profits. Of course, in 
reality, the regulator does not have enough power to fully enforce non-
discrimination in the short run, and could prevent some investments that are 
too biased. However, we believe that this hypothesis, which needs further 
validation, provides a fair starting point. 
  The benefits of accounting separation 
The costs of accounting separation, compared to separation of ownership 
are clear: it leaves scope for unfair competition, both because the regulator 
will have only imperfect tools to prevent discrimination in the short run, and 
because it can lead to biased investments. 
On the other hand, allowing integrated ownership might encourage 
investment, for several reasons. First, both components of the integrated 
firm will take into account the interests of the other component in their 
investment decisions and the free-riding which we discussed above will be 
limited. In particular, the components will be less fearful of finding 
themselves at the mercy of their partner in any future negotiation. The 
benefits of integration for investment in specific capital that we discussed 
above continue to hold under accounting separation. Second, coordination 
between the types of investments will be easier to obtain – for instance the 
decision on interconnection standards will be facilitated. Third, information 
on long-run plans will flow more freely and this will improve the choice of 
investments. 
It is certainly the case that this may lead to a situation where the 
investments would be biased in favour of the service supplier with a link to 
the infrastructure manager. However, even if the regulator cannot provide a 
reasonable defence against discrimination, an investment that is primarily 
intended to serve the integrated service supplier can nevertheless also be 
useful for downstream competitors. For instance, if there is more investment 
in infrastructure because its manager wants to ensure enough capacity for 
one specific service supplier, other service suppliers will benefit. Similarly, 
although the decision on interconnection standards can be biased, in some 
circumstances the bias will be less important that the fact that it is made with 
the interest of both upstream and downstream components in mind. Finally, 
the information which the infrastructure manager receives can foster the 
choice of the right equipment for all service suppliers. 
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It may be worthwhile examining how this optimistic scenario will play in 
the "round wheels" case study discussed above. Recall that a coordinated 
investment decision by upstream and downstream operators is needed to 
implement the new detection technologies. Because the track manager and 
its integrated operator of trains both take into account the long run interests 
of the whole firm, they are able to coordinate on their respective share of the 
investments. The track manager is assured to have at least one partner who 
is interested in using the technology. Because the rail network is equipped, it 
also becomes worthwhile for other users to invest in monitoring equipment. 
Of course, under vertical separation, it may have been possible to reach this 
outcome through contractual arrangements. However, such arrangements 
are likely to be more difficult to reach than agreements between two units of 
the same firm. 
More pessimistic scenarios are of course also possible. It could be the 
case that the regulator has very little control over discriminatory behaviour 
both in the short and long run, and that the investments which are induced 
by vertical integration are of little use to downstream competitors. Our guess 
would be that both types of situations may arise. In Europe at least, the 
regulator has been very focused on one side of the ledger, and our main 
point is that one should look at the other side as well. 
The same type of tradeoffs would arise if the regulator tried to ensure 
non-discrimination in the installation of, say, antennas through divestiture. In 
particular, the fact that the regulator has difficulties enforcing unbiased 
investment in quality stems from the fact that the type of investments which 
are made is not easily observable. This would also make it more difficult to 
ensure that there is enough investment after vertical separation. 
  Summary of a model 
In a recent article, (CREMER et al., 2006) we have built a model that 
illustrates some of these issues. While a formal exposition of this model 
would go beyond the scope of this paper, a summary of the main ideas may 
help understanding the main policy issues.   
This paper studies the impact of "legal unbundling" vs "ownership 
unbundling" on the incentives of a network operator to invest and maintain 
its assets. "Ownership unbundling" is the term used by the European 
Commission for full vertical separation. "Legal unbundling" means that the 
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downstream firm continues to be owned by the upstream firm but that 
management is completely separated. This is stronger than the accounting 
separation discussed above. The results we find have implications for all 
intermediate types of separation.  
It is useful to think of the industry as composed of four types of agents.  
The consumers will play a rather passive role as they simply choose to buy 
from one firm or the other, but regulation takes into account their interest. 
The regulator has only one decision to make: whether or not to impose 
vertical separation. Under vertical separation, there are three firms: an 
upstream firm (the infrastructure manager in our previous discussion) and 
two downstream firms (the service suppliers). With legal unbundling, which 
is a restricted form of vertical integration, the upstream firm and one of the 
downstream firms (or possibly even both firms) will be owned (but not 
managed) by a single entity.  
For simplicity, the upstream firm has only one decision to make: it 
chooses the size of the network. This network is an essential facility which 
the service suppliers must use to produce any service at all. We allow the 
upstream firm to choose investments biased in favour of the downstream 
firm to which it is linked. 
The regulator is able to enforce non-discrimination perfectly. Hence, once 
the upstream firm has chosen its investment, it puts the resulting equipment 
for rent, and the downstream firms compete both for access to the 
infrastructure and in a downstream market. 10 
Our main results are in line with the points made in the previous sections. 
Because the investment in the network is not protected, at the time at which 
it is made, by a contract, the (fully separated) upstream firm will not take into 
account the interests of its clients when choosing its size. This effect can be 
mitigated by allowing it to own part of the downstream industry (even if it 
does not control its management). In other words, ownership separation is 
more detrimental to welfare than legal unbundling. The model is admittedly 
biased: the best structure is always to have the upstream firm own both 
downstream firms, as we are assuming that the regulator has enough power 
to force them to compete. However, we believe that it is of some importance 
that we can show that it is better to have the upstream firm own one 
downstream firm rather than none, even when investment is biased towards 
                     
10 The reader can think of this competition as Bertrand competition with perfect substitutes. 
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the firm it owns (i.e., when one unit of investment is more productive for the 
integrated service supplier than for its competitor).  
  Telecommunications and Information Services 
The aim of this article was to present a brief summary of the main 
conceptual issues involved in the choice of vertical divestiture. Maybe 
somewhat cowardly, we have chosen to use the railways industry as the 
main illustration, as it provides a less confusing set of issues than 
telecommunications, where the problems are more multiform. In particular, 
the list of products, services and activities that can be bundled or unbundled 
in telecoms is daunting.  
For instance, the United States went through a radical phase of 
ownership separation between long distance and local phone services in the 
1980s, after the break-up of AT&T. This facilitated the emergence of strong 
competition in the long-distance communications market. The companies in 
charge of local phone services have since become important providers of 
long distance communications, and strong non discrimination rules are in 
effect to provide a level playing field. We see therefore, in terms of our 
framework, that the US regulatory framework has moved back and forth 
between different models. 
The review of the 2003 "New Regulatory Framework" which is currently 
being conducted by the Commission will, among other topics, examine the 
issue of vertical separation, with a view of encouraging effective competition. 
Clearly, the issue of discrimination is foremost in the mind of the 
Commission, as Viviane Reding stated in REDING (2007) 
"Many of the countries that are behind in broadband coverage and 
take-up have endemic problems of discriminatory behaviour by the 
incumbent: favouring its service providers over competitors. Therefore, 
I believe that, as an exceptional measure, an independent regulator 
should have the power to force an organisational separation of the 
management of the infrastructure from the management of service 
provision. This will create clear and separate incentives for the firm 
offering access to do so in a way that treats all competitors evenly." 
If our analysis is correct, regulators should weigh the trade-off between 
minimising discrimination and lowering incentives for efficiency. This 
analysis can only be done case by case. It is also very difficult, and there are 
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many cases where the regulator, or the competition authorities, 
overestimated the potential for discrimination, while industry overestimated 
the efficiency gains.   
  Conclusions 
Regulators tend to believe that the infrastructure managers whose firm is 
integrated downstream discriminate in ways which are detrimental to social 
efficiency. At least in Europe, they have been favouring strong vertical 
separation. However, one should keep in mind that solving regulatory issues 
through total divestiture may have efficiency costs, which will depend on the 
quality of regulatory controls that can be set in place, and in particular on the 
tools for preventing discrimination. Divestiture may have negative 
consequences on investments. 
We believe that the answers that have been given up to now have been 
somewhat simplistic, since there has been scant examination of the trade-
offs involved. Regulators are certainly not the only ones who should be 
blamed for this situation; the academic community certainly has, at least, an 
equivalent responsibility. This problem has been known to exist for over a 
decade now; the theoretical tools for tackling it are available; it is surprising 
that more work has not been done on these issues.  
 Building a methodology that allows for a quantitative assessment of the 
benefits and costs of different structures in concrete situations may be a 
difficult (or even unfeasible) task. However, it should be possible to rank 
industries by the likeliness that total divestiture is optimal, and to provide 
regulators with advice explaining the critical factors in making decisions 
about the structure of the industry. 
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